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Recent Publications

  • Forecasting the PRC’s Next Global Initiative

    By Kyle Marcrum

    Executive Summary: • Xi Jinping could unveil a “global environmental initiative” as soon as mid-November 2025, at the COP31 summit in Brazil. This would align with previous initiatives that have been announced at international forums. • This new initiative would complete a set of five that matches the five strands in the initial rubric of the “Community of Common Destiny” concept, Beijing’s framework for a new approach to global governance. • The PRC will likely leverage a global environmental initiative and its significant economic advantages in green energy to expand international acceptance of their alternative global governance model.

  • The PLA's Progress screenshot

    By Joshua Arostegui and Jake Vartanian

    This essay examines Xi Jinping’s dictum of creating a world-class military by 2049 and assesses the progress of the PLA ground forces toward achieving that notional benchmark.

  • Slide for GMF's China Global Podcast episode Global Public Security with Chinese Characteristics

    By Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens

    A conversation between Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Bonnie Glaser on China's Global Security Initiative.

  • SSI Live podcast graphic

    In this episode of SSI Live, Major Brennan Deveraux interviews Dr. Brian Carlson, a research professor of Indo-Pacific security studies for the China Landpower Studies Center, on Central Asia. The conversation highlights two drastically different engagements Carlson recently had, one in Kazakhstan and the other at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies in southern Germany. The discussion explores the nature of China-Russia relations and the significance of the Central Asian states in the context of great-power competition.

  • Slide for Adapting to Future Wars: The Reorganization of the PLA Army’s Special Operations Forces and the Move toward Professionalization

    By Joshua Arostegui

    The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) implemented major changes to the organization, accession, and training of its army’s special operations forces (SOF) beginning in 2017, including the creation of a 12-man SOF team and establishment of a probable national-level army-subordinate counterterrorism unit. Beginning in 2025, the PLA introduced several changes to improve officer accession and noncommissioned officer retention in its special operations community. This article assesses observed changes since 2017 designed to improve the PLA’s command and control of its army’s SOF units and to set the foundation for China’s elite forces becoming world-class by 2049.

  • Slide for China’s September 2025 Military Parade: How PLA Ground Forces Are Adapting to Future Wars and Force Projection

    China’s military parades are often viewed as a form of deterrence by giving Xi Jinping an opportunity to showcase the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advanced weapons systems to the world and bring like-minded authoritarian leaders from partner states together in a show of unity against the Western-led international liberal order. The extravagant events, however, also open a window into understanding Beijing’s expectation of how and where it will fight in the future. Despite the unveiling of several new weapons driven through Tiananmen Square during the 70-minute parade, most of them, like the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile and LY-1 shipborne laser air defense system, were designed to deter and defeat the United States and its allies in the air and maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, the first formations of vehicles to cross in front of Xi and his guests, those belonging to the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Air Force Airborne Corps (PLAAFAC), and PLA Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC), represented something different: an acknowledgement that future wars will be global and force projection needs to be accompanied by land-based firepower and protection.

CLSC Dialogues

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The articles and commentaries published on the CLSC website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The articles and commentaries published on the CLSC website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed on the website are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press products enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official US policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of War of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of War does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.