USAWC Crest
China Landpower Studies Center logo

Articles

  • Slide for GMF's China Global Podcast episode Global Public Security with Chinese Characteristics

    By Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens

    A conversation between Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Bonnie Glaser on China's Global Security Initiative.

  • Slide for Adapting to Future Wars: The Reorganization of the PLA Army’s Special Operations Forces and the Move toward Professionalization

    By Joshua Arostegui

    The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) implemented major changes to the organization, accession, and training of its army’s special operations forces (SOF) beginning in 2017, including the creation of a 12-man SOF team and establishment of a probable national-level army-subordinate counterterrorism unit. Beginning in 2025, the PLA introduced several changes to improve officer accession and noncommissioned officer retention in its special operations community. This article assesses observed changes since 2017 designed to improve the PLA’s command and control of its army’s SOF units and to set the foundation for China’s elite forces becoming world-class by 2049.

  • Slide for China’s September 2025 Military Parade: How PLA Ground Forces Are Adapting to Future Wars and Force Projection

    China’s military parades are often viewed as a form of deterrence by giving Xi Jinping an opportunity to showcase the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) advanced weapons systems to the world and bring like-minded authoritarian leaders from partner states together in a show of unity against the Western-led international liberal order. The extravagant events, however, also open a window into understanding Beijing’s expectation of how and where it will fight in the future. Despite the unveiling of several new weapons driven through Tiananmen Square during the 70-minute parade, most of them, like the YJ-20 hypersonic anti-ship missile and LY-1 shipborne laser air defense system, were designed to deter and defeat the United States and its allies in the air and maritime domains of the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, the first formations of vehicles to cross in front of Xi and his guests, those belonging to the PLA Army (PLAA), PLA Air Force Airborne Corps (PLAAFAC), and PLA Navy Marine Corps (PLANMC), represented something different: an acknowledgement that future wars will be global and force projection needs to be accompanied by land-based firepower and protection.

  • Inside China's Global Security Playbook

    By Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, Isaac B. Kardon, and Cameron Waltz

    Global outreach by China’s internal security agencies is expanding. This nonmilitary security

  • Slide for Planning for Protracted Conflict with China: Five Questions to Ask

    By Dr. Sheena Chestnut Greitens

    Where and how a conflict starts will affect the kind of war it will be.

  • Slide for Assessing the PLA’s Strengths and Weaknesses for Achieving the PRC’s Goals

    By Dennis J. Blasko and Rick Gunnell

    This chapter examines the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) within the context of its modernization process and argues that the persistence of shortcomings may undercut the confidence senior leaders would prefer to have before deciding to initiate major combat.

  • Ecuador’s Incoming Government Faces Difficult Choices Regarding China | R. Evan Ellis

    By Dr. Evan Ellis, PhD

    With Daniel Noboa returning to the presidency and a new Chinese ambassador on the way, China-Ecuador

  • China’s Coming Diplomatic Blitz in the Americas | R. Evan Ellis

    By Dr. R. Evan Ellis, PhD

    The next few months will bring a series of high-profile multilateral engagements between China and

  • Transnational Organized Crime in Mexico and the Government’s Response | R. Evan Ellis

    By Dr. R. Evan Ellis

    The US government threats of tariffs on the Mexican government if it did not do more to control

  • Waging War without Disruption: China’s People’s Armed Police in a Future Conflict  | Jake Rinaldi

    By Jake Rinaldi

    As one of the three branches of China’s armed forces, the People’s Armed Police (PAP) (人民武装警察) operates alongside the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) (人民解放军) and the militia (民兵) as a key instrument of Chinese Communist Party power. According to the Science of Military Strategy, a foundational textbook used to educate senior Chinese military officers, the People’s Armed Police is tasked with meeting the strategic requirements of “multi-functional integration, stability and rights maintenance” (多能一体,维稳维权).

DISCLAIMER

The articles and commentaries published on the CLSC website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The articles and commentaries published on the CLSC website are unofficial expressions of opinion. The views and opinions expressed on the website are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Department of War, the Department of the Army, the US Army War College, or any other agency of the US government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute and US Army War College Press products enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent official US policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. The appearance of external hyperlinks does not constitute endorsement by the Department of War of the linked websites or the information, products, or services contained therein. The Department of War does not exercise any editorial, security, or other control over the information you may find at these locations.